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ALL YOUR BASE ARE BELONG TO US: 
TOWARDS AN APPROPRIATE USAGE AND 
DEFINITION OF THE “ENTIRE MARKET 
VALUE” RULE IN REASONABLE ROYALTIES 
CALCULATIONS 
Abstract: Heated scholarly debate has accompanied the importation of 
the “entire market value” rule into reasonable royalties awards. The rule’s 
natural ambit lies within lost profits calculations; indeed, the very defini-
tion of the entire market value rule is unclear within the reasonable royal-
ties context. Yet the Federal Circuit has applied, or claimed to have ap-
plied, the rule in the reasonable royalties context. But when that court 
has invoked the rule, it was, in actuality, merely calculating a reasonable 
royalty as a percentage of a 100% royalty base. This Note proposes a new 
name for such use: the “entire market base” rule. The traditional “entire 
market value” rule appellation, accordingly, should be used exclusively in 
lost profits calculations. Further, the purpose of the entire market base 
rule is to avoid juror prejudice, as is clear from the Federal Circuit’s 2011 
decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. and the Federal Trade Com-
mission's March 7, 2011 report. Thus, this Note proposes that the entire 
market base rule be recast by the Federal Circuit as a specific application 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on avoiding unfairly prejudicing the jury. 
Properly defining and distinguishing the entire market base rule will en-
able courts to tailor the rule to incentivize innovation and further the 
proper purposes of patent law. 
Introduction 
 Patentees in recent years have wielded the entire profits of infring-
ing products at trial to receive gargantuan reasonable royalty patent 
damage awards from juries, out of proportion to the patented tech-
nologies’ contributions to those products.1 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1296, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(describing a jury award of $388 million in reasonable royalties damages); Lucent Techs., 
Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing a jury award of $357 
million in reasonable royalties damages). The phrase “All your base are belong to us” (some-
times abbreviated AYBABTU) originally appeared in the Japanese video game Zero Wing and 
quickly became an underground humor sensation, appearing across the internet as well as 
on T-shirts and posters. Chris Taylor, All Your Base Are Belong to Us, Time.com (Feb. 25, 2001), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,100525,00.html. The phrase here 
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for the Federal Circuit has invoked the “entire market value” rule to 
curb these disproportionate awards.2 Yet, considerable confusion sur-
rounds the rule’s application to reasonable royalties.3 First, the rule as 
originally conceived ought to have no place in reasonable royalty 
awards.4 Scholars and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have 
accordingly condemned the use of the rule in the reasonable royalties 
context and urged its abolition.5 Second, although the Federal Circuit 
says in its opinions that it has applied the rule to reasonable royalties 
calculations, it has not actually done so.6 It has rather applied some 
other rule, a 100% royalty base rule, masquerading as the “entire mar-
ket value” rule.7 Without language to describe what courts are doing, it 
is difficult for judges, attorneys, scholars, and commentators to dispel 
the confusion.8 The lack of differentiation furthermore inhibits a nu-
anced discussion of the policy underlying this 100% royalty base rule.9 
 This Note attempts to clear the air by proposing a new name, the 
“entire market base” rule, to label the 100% royalty base rule that has 
actually been used by the Federal Circuit in reasonable royalties deter-
minations.10 The Note then explores the policy basis for this rule and 
examines the appropriateness of the test the Federal Circuit has an-
nounced, namely whether the patented component constitutes the ba-
                                                                                                                      
alludes to (1) the erroneous use of the term “entire market value” rule when actually refer-
ring to a 100% royalty base in reasonable royalties calculations, (2) assertions that the rule has 
been wrongly imported to inflate reasonable royalty calculations, and (3) the rule’s conspicu-
ity in recent gargantuan patent damage awards that the Federal Circuit slashed on appeal. See 
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 655, 662 n.34, 664 (2009). 
2 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1309. 
3 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1309. 
4 See infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. Whether the entire market value 
rule’s application to reasonable royalties calculations is justified is beyond the scope of this 
Note. For an analysis and justification of the rule’s use in reasonable royalty calculations 
according to the prospect theory of patents, see Michael A. Greene, A Prospect Theory 
Justification for the “Entire Market Value” Rule in Reasonable Royalties Calculations ( Jan. 
9, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1981835. 
6 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 & n.34, 668–69 & n.63; infra notes 174–177 and 
accompanying text. 
7 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 & n.34, 668–69 & n.63; infra notes 174–177 and 
accompanying text. 
8 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 & n.34, 668–69 & n.63; infra notes 174–177 and 
accompanying text. 
9 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 & n.34, 668–69 & n.63; infra notes 174–177 and 
accompanying text. 
10 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 & n.34, 668–69 & n.63; infra notes 174–177 and 
accompanying text. 
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sis for consumer demand.11 Finally, as the real purpose of the “entire 
market base” rule as used by the Federal Circuit is to avoid juror preju-
dice, this Note proposes recasting the rule as a specific application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and entrusting the determination to the 
sound discretion of the trial court.12 
 Part I of this Note explores the underpinnings of patent damages 
law, including its constitutional, statutory, common law, and policy 
bases, and introduces the “entire market value” rule.13 Part II discusses 
the two disparate uses of the phrase “entire market value” rule, and 
urges a new designation—the “entire market base” rule—for use in rea-
sonable royalties calculations.14 Finally, Part III argues that the entire 
market base rule is best understood as a means to avoid unfairly preju-
dicing the jury, and urges that the rule be recast as an application of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403.15 
I. Underpinnings of Patent Damages Law 
 The primary purpose of damages in patent infringements is to 
compensate and to make the patentee whole after infringement.16 The 
requisite compensation to make the patentee whole, however, depends 
upon the nature of the patented invention and the marketing intent 
and capabilities of the patentee.17 
A. Nature and Purpose of Patent Protection 
 The goal of patent law is to incentivize innovation by granting an 
inventor, for a limited time, an exclusive monopoly over all use of a pa-
tent.18 The U.S. Constitution granted Congress the power “[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”19 Likewise, 35 U.S.C. § 271 provides that 
“whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any pat-
ented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, 
                                                                                                                      
11 See infra notes 181–188 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 189–238 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 16–130 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 131–188 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 189–238 and accompanying text. 
16 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 657–61. 
17 See id. 
18 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
19 See id. 
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infringes the patent.”20 A patent is thus a constitutionally mandated 
and statutorily imposed short-term monopoly for the patentee.21 
                                                                                                                     
 The reason a monopoly grant is thought necessary to incentivize 
innovation is to solve the free-riding problem.22 Without patent protec-
tion, an inventor of a new technology of great benefit to society might 
not reap the rewards of his or her investment in innovation because 
others could freely appropriate the novel techniques and ideas in-
vented.23 Inadequate incentive would then exist for investment in the 
research and development necessary to create new inventions, and our 
society’s technological progress would be retarded.24 
 It is in the nature of a monopoly that it grants its owner more rev-
enues than if its market were broken into segments with competing en-
tities selling the same product.25 A monopolist’s market power enables 
it to charge higher prices from consumers of its product, who have no 
alternative but to purchase from the single available source.26 When 
 
20 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
21 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C § 271; 1 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on 
Patents at OV-1 (2011). 
22 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of In-
tellectual Property Law 18–20 (2003) (explaining that, absent patent protection, intel-
lectual property is freely appropriable by free riders, harming incentives to invent); Ro-
bert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 133 
(5th ed. 2010) (“[A]bsent patent protection inventors will not have sufficient incentive to 
invest in creating, developing, and marketing new products. Patent law provides a market-
driven incentive to invest in innovation, by allowing the inventor to appropriate the full 
economic rewards of her invention.”); see also Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifi-
cations for Intellectual Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 129 (2004) (“The traditional eco-
nomic justification for intellectual property is well known. Ideas are public goods: they can 
be copied freely and used by anyone who is aware of them without depriving others of 
their use.”). 
23 See Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 18–20; Merges et al., supra note 22, at 133. 
But note that some types of innovation may reach efficient levels even absent patent pro-
tection because of other mechanisms for overcoming market failure, such as lead-time 
advantages, reputational effects, trade secrecy, and public grants and awards. See generally, 
e.g., Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review of the Patent System 15–17, 44 (Comm. 
Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) (discussing lead-time advantages together with 
grants and prizes as alternatives to the patent regime, detailing the history of proposals in 
the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries for such systems of prizes and grants, 
and presenting arguments by some economists that many of the inventions for which pat-
ents are granted would have also been made without any patent system). 
24 See Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 18–20; Merges et al., supra note 22, at 133. 
25 See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 489 (1853) (“If he should grant li-
censes to all who might desire to manufacture his composition, mutual competition might 
destroy the value of each license.”); Lemley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32 (detailing the eco-
nomic logic for why monopoly profits exceed combined competitive profits). 
26 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489; Lemley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32. 
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multiple sellers offer competing products in that same market space, 
the ability of consumers to choose the source of their goods based on 
pricing causes the sum total of sellers’ revenues, all other things being 
equal, to be smaller than what a single monopoly could draw from the 
market.27 
B. Damages 
 Section 284 of Title 35 of the U.S. Code entitles a prevailing patent 
holder in an infringement action to “damages adequate to compensate 
for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the 
use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”28 Courts have inter-
preted this statutory language to mean that two possible damage 
awards may be granted: lost profits and reasonable royalty.29 
1. Lost Profits 
 The award of lost profits is intended to approximate, in realistic 
fashion, what the patentee would have profited had the infringer not 
interfered with his or her patent rights.30 The Supreme Court framed 
the inquiry in this fashion: “[H]ad the Infringer not infringed, what 
would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?”31 This inquiry is intensely 
fact-based, dependent on the peculiar circumstances of each case.32 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489; Lemley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32. Due to the differ-
ences between monopolistic and competitive markets, when an infringing invention is 
marketed in competition with the patentee, the total combined revenues received by both 
parties, all other things being equal, will be smaller than the revenues that the patentee 
could have generated had its monopoly rights been observed. See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489; 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32. One surprising result of this natural situation is that, 
to compensate a patentee for patent infringement, the infringer often must pay more in 
damages than it gained in profits due to its infringement. See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489; Lem-
ley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32. This is due to the surplusage that a competitive market-
place affords consumers; the infringer must restore that surplusage to the patentee to 
compensate for the loss of monopolistic market advantage. See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489; 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32. 
28 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (emphasis added). 
29 See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir. 
1978). 
30 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490. 
31 See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964); 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Lemley, supra note 1, at 
655–61; see also Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490. 
32 See Aro, 377 U.S. at 507; Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490 (“The question is not what specula-
tively he may have lost, but what actually he did lose.”); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546. 
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 Because of the intentionally monopolistic nature of the patent 
right, courts consider a sweeping variety of losses when determining 
lost profits.33 Lost profits are intended to capture the entire govern-
ment-granted monopoly value that a patent holder would have had.34 
Similar in conception to expectation damages in contract law, lost prof-
its are intended to put the patentee in the same position, as if the in-
fringement had not occurred.35 
 Obviously, lost profits therefore encompass profits from lost 
sales.36 They also encompass a sweeping degree of other losses.37 Indi-
rect damages, such as the lost ability to grow and thereby sell other un-
patented products, are awarded.38 Damages based on the forced lower-
ing of prices due to competition in the market are available.39 
Patentees can recover the profits on unpatented goods that are ordi-
narily marketed with the patented product, and which the patentee 
would have been able to sell as a package deal if not for the infringing 
product.40 Thus, awards based on lost profits can be sweeping and strik-
ingly large.41 They encompass everything the inventor would have 
gained but for the infringement, often amounting to more than the 
infringer drew in revenues based on infringing sales.42 
                                                                                                                     
 The infringed party must not only prove each one of these factors, 
but must also prove the absence of any mitigating factors.43 These miti-
 
 
33 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 863 
(Fed. Cir. 1985); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156; Lemley, supra note 1, at 655–61. 
34 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863; Panduit, 575 F.2d at 
1156; Lemley, supra note 1, at 655–61. 
35 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863; Panduit, 575 F.2d at 
1156; Lemley, supra note 1, at 655–61. 
36 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863; Panduit, 575 F.2d at 
1156; Lemley, supra note 1, at 660. 
37 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863; Paper Converting 
Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 
1156; Lemley, supra note 1, at 660. 
38 See Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Lemley, 
supra note 1, at 657, 660. 
39 See Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22; Lemley, supra note 1, at 660. 
40 See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(reversing the district court and holding that the patentee could recover lost profits not 
only on its patented syrup dispenser but on unpatented syrups ordinarily sold with the 
dispenser); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 974–75 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
41 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 863; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d 
at 22; Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156; Leesona, 599 F.2d at 974–75; Lemley, supra note 1, at 660. 
42 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1546; Lemley, supra note 1, at 661 & n.32. 
43 See State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577–78, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1989); Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 552–55 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(adopting in the Federal Circuit the four-factor Panduit test as an acceptable, though not 
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gating factors, which could be numerous, are market-based and fact-
specific.44 For example, the inability to manufacture sufficient quantity 
to satisfy the market demand mitigates lost profits damages.45 Courts 
also look to the existence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes for 
the patented invention, as well as the patentee’s likelihood of legally 
dividing profits between itself and other producers.46 It is thus routine 
that even manufacturing patentees who appear entitled to lost profits 
damages are unable to carry their evidentiary burden and must settle 
for a lesser award.47 
2. Reasonable Royalty 
 When patentees are unable to prove lost profits, the lesser award 
available to them by statute is the reasonable royalty.48 The reasonable 
royalty, at least in theory, is an entirely different calculation designed to 
reach an entirely different damages result.49 A reasonable royalty, as 
provided by the statute, is designed to capture what the patentee would 
have earned had it licensed the rights to market the infringed inven-
tion.50 
                                                                                                                      
 
the only, method for proving entitlement to lost profits damages); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 
1156 (announcing a fact-intensive, four-factor test for proving lost profit damages, later 
known as the Panduit test and adopted by the Federal Circuit in Gyromat); Lemley, supra 
note 1, at 658–62 (detailing the multifarious evidentiary burden on the patentee in prov-
ing entitlement to lost profits). 
44 See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577–78, 1580; Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 552–55; Panduit, 575 
F.2d at 1156 (disallowing recovery of lost profits because of failure of evidence to ade-
quately separate profits from costs); Lemley, supra note 1, at 658–62. 
45 See Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 552–55; Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156 (listing manufacturing and 
marketing capability to exploit market demand as a necessary element in proving entitle-
ment to lost profits); Lemley, supra note 1, at 658–62. 
46 See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1578, 1580 (endorsing a calculation of lost profits dam-
ages in which the patentee recovers according to its market share with respect to licensee 
or otherwise noninfringing competitors); Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 552–55; Panduit, 575 F.2d at 
1156 (listing the absence of noninfringing alternatives as a necessary element in proving 
entitlement to lost profits); Lemley, supra note 1, at 658 & n.14 (detailing how courts ap-
portion market share under a lost profits calculation). 
47 See State Indus., 883 F.2d at 1577–78, 1580; Gyromat, 735 F.2d at 552–55; Panduit, 575 
F.2d at 1156 (disallowing recovery of lost profits due to inadequate evidence of fixed costs, 
despite ample evidence of other types of costs); Lemley, supra note 1, at 658–62, 666–68 
(arguing that many patentees who should be entitled to lost profits are unreasonably de-
nied them due to the overly burdensome Panduit evidentiary requirements). 
48 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156–57; Merges et al., supra note 
22, at 390; Lemley, supra note 1, at 659–60, 661. 
49 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 661. 
50 See 35 U.S.C. § 284; Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (“A ‘reasonable royalty’ contemplates a hypothetical negotiation between the 
patentee and the infringer at a time before the infringement began.”); Georgia-Pacific 
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 The methodology for calculating reasonable royalties is distinct 
from that used in calculating lost profits.51 For example, in any licens-
ing negotiation, the licensee will itself profit from marketing the inven-
tion, which lessens profits for the inventor.52 Thus, although the market 
may retain a monopolistic nature, the profits that can be drawn from 
the market are divided between the two companies.53 This is one rea-
son that reasonable royalties damages are usually less than lost profits.54 
 Furthermore, reasonable royalties calculations take into considera-
tion the likelihood that the patentee would have licensed the product to 
multiple parties.55 In such a case, the monopoly market power is de-
stroyed and each license becomes strikingly less valuable.56 In fact, over 
two hundred years ago Congress contemplated just such a lessening of 
revenues effect in its revision to the Patent Act of 1793.57 The Patent Act 
of 1793 provided damages based on the “price for which the patentee 
has usually sold or licensed” the patented invention.58 Thus, the award 
was based on the measure of what a grant of a license would have cost to 
the licensee.59 Congress, in enacting the Patent Act of 1800, recognized 
that such a measure fails to capture the value of a monopoly power over 
an invention and changed the remedy to the “actual damage sustained 
                                                                                                                      
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (setting out the 
famous list of factors, adopted by the Federal Circuit and known as the Georgia-Pacific fac-
tors, to consider in simulating a hypothetical licensing negotiation); Merges et al., supra 
note 22, at 390. 
51 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 661–69. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489; Lemley, supra note 1, at 661. 
56 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 489 (“If he should grant licenses to all who might desire to 
manufacture his composition, mutual competition might destroy the value of each license.”). 
57 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 22 (“[An infringer] . . . shall forfeit 
and pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price, for 
which the patentee has usually sold or licenses to other persons, the use of the . . . inven-
tion.”); Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488. 
58 See Patent Act of 1793 § 5; Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488. 
59 See Patent Act of 1793 § 5; Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488. 
2012] Towards an Appropriate Usage and Definition of the “Entire Market Value” Rule 241 
by such patentee.”60 This is another reason that reasonable royalty dam-
ages awards tend to be smaller than lost profits awards.61 
C. The “Entire Market Value” Rule 
 One particular example germane to this Note of damages in-
tended to restore the patentee to the position the patentee would have 
occupied absent infringement is the “entire market value” rule.62 As it 
intends to fully restore the patentee’s expectation value, the rule’s nat-
ural ambit is within lost profits calculations.63 This Section discusses the 
origins of the rule and the expansionist trends that see it entering rea-
sonable royalties calculations in recent case law.64 
1. Natural Territory 
 The “entire market value” rule states that, when the patented in-
vention is but one component of the infringer’s compound product, 
the patentee is nonetheless entitled to damages representing sales of 
the entire compound product if the patented component caused cus-
tomer demand for the whole.65 In such circumstances, the patentee 
would have itself made the sale of a comparable compound product.66 
The entire market value rule thus naturally applies to lost profits 
awards, which are designed to capture the profits the patentee would 
have earned absent infringement.67 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Patent Act of 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38 (“[A]ny person [who] . . . shall 
make, devise, use, or sell the thing whereof the exclusive right is secured to the said pat-
entee . . . shall forfeit and pay . . . a sum equal to three times the actual damage sustained 
by such patentee.”); Seymour, 57 U.S. at 488 (“[A]s experience began to show that some 
inventions or discoveries had their chief value in a monopoly of use by the inventor, and 
not in a sale of licenses, the value of a license could not be made a universal rule, as a 
measure of damages.”). 
61 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 661–69. 
62 See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986); King In-
strument, 767 F.2d at 865; Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 
649, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22. 
63 See, e.g., TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; 
Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22. 
64 See infra notes 65–130 and accompanying text. 
65 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549–51; TWM, 789 F.2d at 900–01; King Instrument, 767 F.2d 
at 865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22–23; Leesona, 599 F.2d at 974. 
66 See TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Pa-
per Converting, 745 F.2d at 22. 
67 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549–51; TWM, 789 F.2d at 900–01; King Instrument, 767 F.2d 
at 865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22–23; Leesona, 599 F.2d at 974; 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 660. 
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 In its 1853 decision in Seymour v. McCormick, the U.S. Supreme 
Court delineated some of the earliest guidelines to the entire market 
value rule, though the rule was not mentioned by name.68 That case 
concerned the infringement of a certain patented improvement, re-
lated to the addition of a seat to a machine for reaping small grain.69 
The reaping machine’s general design was the subject of an expired 
patent and therefore within the public domain.70 At trial, the judge had 
instructed the jury that the amount awarded in damages should reflect 
the value of the entire machine—despite the fact that the patented in-
vention comprised but one component of the otherwise public ma-
chine—and damages were awarded on that enlarged basis.71 
 On review, the Supreme Court announced the basic principle that 
damages are limited to the patented component’s contribution to the 
whole product.72 The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial 
court, calling it “very grave error” to instruct the jury as it had.73 The 
Court cited evidence that the plaintiff had sold licenses to use his pat-
ented improvement for a fixed sum, stating that “[w]hen he has himself 
established the market value of his improvement, as separate and dis-
tinct from the other machinery with which it is connected, he can have 
no claim in justice or equity to make the profits of the whole machine 
the measure of his demand.”74 The Court held that “actual” damages75 
must be factually based, sharply criticizing the trial court’s damages 
award as “better entitled to the epithet of ‘speculative,’ ‘imaginary,’ or 
‘fanciful,’ than that of ‘actual.’”76 The Court furthermore presciently 
warned of the dangers of “royalty stacking,” whereby an infringing party 
could be forced (through multiple suits brought by patentees of small 
components) to pay many times the entire machine’s value if damages 
are not limited to each patented component’s actual contribution.77 
                                                                                                                      
 
68 See 57 U.S. at 489–91. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. at 486–87. 
72 See id. at 491. 
73 See id. 
74 Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490–91. 
75 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (“That whenever . . . a verdict shall 
be rendered for the plaintiff in [an infringement] action . . . it shall be in the power of the 
court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the ac-
tual damages sustained by the plaintiff.”). 
76 Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490–91. 
77 See id. at 490 (“[T]he unfortunate mechanic may be compelled to pay treble his 
whole profits to each of a dozen or more several inventors of some small improvement in 
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 Despite the Court’s strongly worded disapprobation of damages 
based on the entire value of a machine in which the patented invention 
is but one component, the Court did allude to—if it failed to deline-
ate—a scenario in which such an award would be appropriate.78 The 
Court stated that “there may be cases where, from some peculiar cir-
cumstance, the patentee may show actual damage to a larger amount” 
than the value of the patented component alone.79 Nevertheless, it cau-
tioned that such a claim must be substantiated by “clear and distinct 
evidence,” and that the trier of fact may only find such damages “as 
have actually been proved to have been sustained.”80 Thus the Court 
alluded to an appropriate application of the entire market value rule 
and laid out general principles for determining its scope and purpose, 
though it did not set down precise guidelines.81 
 The precise contours of the entire market value rule were then 
developed in the twentieth century by the lower courts.82 The U.S. 
Court of Claims, one of the predecessor courts to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,83 applied the rule in its 1942 decision 
in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States.84 That case 
dealt with a patent for tuning the oscillating circuits of a radio transmit-
ter and receiver by inserting a “lumped inductance” into the antenna.85 
The court stated that the invention, though relating only to one com-
ponent, was of “such paramount importance that it substantially cre-
ated the value” of the entire radio transmitter and receiver and there-
fore falls within the entire market value rule.86 
 The appellate courts then honed the entire market value rule into 
its present form, that a component patentee receives the profits of the 
                                                                                                                      
the engine he has built.”); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Roy-
alty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991, 1992, 2010–20 (2007). 
78 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. 
82 See, e.g., TWM, 789 F.2d at 900–01 (“The entire market value rule allows for the re-
covery of damages based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several features, 
when the feature patented constitutes the basis for customer demand.”); King Instrument, 
767 F.2d at 865 (“The ‘entire market value’ rule allows for the recovery of damages based 
on the value of an entire apparatus including non-patented parts, even though only one of 
the features in the apparatus is patented.”); Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d 
at 22; Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 1, 20–21 (1942), rev’d in 
part on other grounds, 320 U.S. 1 (1943). 
83 See Kori, 761 F.2d at 656 n.3. 
84 99 Ct. Cl. at 20–21. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 21. 
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total compound product only when its patented component constitutes 
the basis for customer demand for the compound product.87 For ex-
ample, in its 1979 decision in Leesona Corp. v. United States, the Court of 
Claims applied the rule to an infringed patent for mechanically re-
chargeable metal-air batteries consisting of a battery box, a cover, and 
attendant hardware.88 The court ruled that non-infringing anodes, ca-
thodes, and blower covers, ordinarily purchased as part of one gov-
ernment procurement, were to be included in the damages award be-
cause of their “financial and marketing dependence” on the market 
created by the patent.89 Thus, the test for applying the entire market 
value rule became where the non-infringing features of a machine ex-
hibit a financial and marketing dependence on the infringed inven-
tion.90 This holding was subsequently affirmed and followed by the 
Federal Circuit.91 
 In its 1986 decision in TWM Manufacturing Co. v. Dura Corp., the 
Federal Circuit ruled that the entire market value rule applies “[w]here 
a hypothetical licensee would have anticipated an increase in sales of 
collateral unpatented items because of the patented device,” and that 
the rule applies when the patented feature “constitutes the basis for 
customer demand.”92 In that case, a truck manufacturer infringed the 
plaintiff‘s patented invention of a suspension system enabling trucks to 
use an additional axle and wheels for heavy loads.93 The trial court 
awarded damages based on both the value of the patented suspension 
and of unpatented wheels and axles because, despite being provided to 
truck manufacturers by the suspension manufacturer as a mere “con-
venience,” those wheels and axles were ordinarily purchased from the 
suspension manufacturer and were within its anticipated profits from 
its patented invention.94 
 The entire market value rule’s natural ambit is clearly within lost 
profits awards, where the patented feature is what caused customer 
demand for the compound product or was otherwise responsible for 
                                                                                                                      
87 See, e.g., TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; Leesona, 599 F.2d at 974; Tektronix, Inc. v. United 
States, 552 F.2d 343, 351–52 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
88 See 599 F.2d at 974–75. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See Kori, 761 F.2d at 656 & n.3 (“This court has adopted the body of law established 
by its predecessor courts, The United States Court of Claims and the United States Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals.”). 
92 789 F.2d at 901. 
93 Id. at 897. 
94 See id. at 901. 
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nearly all of the value of that product.95 The justification for the rule is 
that the patentee would have itself sold a comparable compound prod-
uct were it not for the infringement.96 Because lost profit damages are 
intended to provide what the patentee “would have made, if the in-
fringer had not interfered with his rights,” the patentee is entitled to 
profits for the entire compound product.97 
2. Expansion to New Territory 
 Perhaps due to perceived inequities in the smaller reasonable roy-
alty award, the use of the entire market value rule has expanded to 
cases in which its policy justifications do not seem to apply.98 
 The entire market value rule fits comfortably into lost profits cal-
culations, to provide the patentee with the profits the patentee had it-
self attempted to reap by marketing a compound product containing 
the patented component.99 The rule should not apply to the patentee 
that never intended to market its own product and instead planned to 
derive revenue through licensing its patented component to other 
marketers.100 In that case, no sales of unpatented components in con-
junction with the sale of the patented invention would have been an-
ticipated by the patentee.101 
 Yet due perhaps to the difficult evidentiary burden that a patentee 
must carry in recovering lost profits and the appearance of inequity 
when that burden proves too heavy, courts have applied the entire 
market value rule to the reasonable royalties calculation.102 This appli-
                                                                                                                      
 
95 See id.; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 
F.2d at 22. 
96 See TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Pa-
per Converting, 745 F.2d at 22. 
97 See Seymour, 57 U.S. at 490; TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 865; 
Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22. 
98 See Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Tec Air, Inc. v. Den-
so Mfg. Mich., Inc., 192 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
107 F.3d 1543, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 (characterizing the 
application of entire market value rule to reasonable royalties calculations as an illogical 
“doctrinal creep”). 
99 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549–51; TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 
865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22. 
100 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549–51; TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 
865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662. 
101 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549–51; TWM, 789 F.2d at 901; King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 
865; Kori, 761 F.2d at 656; Paper Converting, 745 F.2d at 22; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662. 
102 See Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361 (affirming reasonable royalties damages based on the en-
tire market value rule); Tec Air, 192 F.3d at 1357, 1362 (affirming the jury award of reason-
able royalties damages based on entire infringing sales of compound product); Fonar, 107 
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cation of the entire market value rule increases the royalty base and 
thus increases compensation, but its application in this context has 
drawn severe scholarly criticism.103 
 On March 7, 2011, the FTC registered its disapproval of applying 
the entire market value rule to reasonable royalties awards.104 It issued 
a 300-page report containing its detailed recommendations for adjust-
ing patent remedies to best incentivize innovation.105 The report is the 
culmination of a series of FTC hearings and workshops held from De-
cember 2008 through May 2010, in conjunction with the Department 
of Justice, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the academic and 
business communities, on the subject of patent damages law and its ef-
fect on competition and innovation.106 The report finds that the entire 
market value rule has no appropriate application whatsoever to reason-
able royalties calculations.107 It unequivocally urges courts to eliminate 
the rule in that context, describing the rule as “irrelevant” and stating 
that it “risks injecting significant confusion that threatens to produce 
inaccurate awards.”108 This Note intends to dispel such confusion sur-
rounding the entire market value rule.109 
                                                                                                                      
F.3d at 1552 (affirming the jury award of reasonable royalties damages based on entire 
market value of infringing sales); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156–57 (denying the lost profits 
award because of plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate arguably hyper-technical details of lost 
sales); Robert P. Merges & John F. Duffy, Patent Law and Policy 980 (4th ed. 2007) 
(noting the beneficial effect of artificially inflating reasonable royalty awards where manu-
facturing patentee is unable to carry the lost profits evidentiary burden); Lemley, supra 
note 1, at 660, 662 (arguing that courts have artificially inflated reasonable royalties awards 
to compensate plaintiffs seemingly deserving of lost profits awards but unable to carry the 
evidentiary burden). 
103 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Amy Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation to 
the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 307, 361–62 (2006) (argu-
ing that applying the entire market value rule in reasonable royalties cases cuts against the 
section 284 statutory requirement of a reasonable royalty for the use made “of the invention,” 
referring to the patented component only); Lemley, supra note 1, at 661–64 (criticizing the 
application of entire market value rule to reasonable royalties as unreasonable). 
104 See FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies 
with Competition (2011) [hereinafter FTC Report], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. at 2. 
107 See id. at 24–25, 205, 207–09, 211. 
108 See id. 
109 See id.; infra notes 131–238 and accompanying text. 
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3. Recent Trends in Case Law 
 The entire market value rule continues to baffle trial courts as to 
what appropriate remedies should be, contributing to the problem of 
patent damages ballooning out of control.110 The Federal Circuit, how-
ever, is beginning to impose order on this misunderstood area.111 
 In its 2009 decision of Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit grappled with the entire market value rule in the con-
text of computer software.112 Lucent was the assignee of a patent 
granted to an early innovator of graphical user interfaces who was em-
ployed by AT&T in the 1980s.113 Lucent alleged infringement of its pat-
ented invention by defendant Microsoft’s ubiquitous Outlook software 
application.114 The patent taught a method of entering information 
into bit-mapped graphics fields on a computer screen using a pointing 
device instead of a keyboard, which was novel in its time.115 In 2002, 
Lucent filed suit alleging infringement of its patent by Microsoft Of-
fice’s, Microsoft Money’s, and Windows Mobile’s use of date-picker cal-
endar selecting widgets in their graphical user interfaces.116 The jury 
found Microsoft liable for patent infringement as to all three software 
products and, based on all of the profits of Microsoft Outlook, awarded roy-
alty damages of $357 million.117 
 The Federal Circuit struck down the jury’s verdict.118 It cited the 
Supreme Court’s reprimand in Seymour v. McCormick that it is “very 
grave error” to instruct a jury that the value of damages is the same 
whether the infringement relates to the entire device sold or merely to 
one of its components.119 The Federal Circuit held that there was no 
basis for the trial court’s application of the entire market value rule to 
this case.120 No evidence suggested that the patented invention, the 
date-picker calendar widget, provided any basis for the customer de-
                                                                                                                      
110 See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and 
Harm, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 905, 906–08 (2010); infra notes 112–130 and accompanying text. 
111 See id. 
112 See 580 F.3d at 1308. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 1309. 
118 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
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mand for Microsoft Outlook.121 Citing also the relative unimportance 
of the date-picker feature among such other critical components of 
Outlook as email, the court dismissed the verdict as unreasonable.122 
 In Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co., the District Court for the 
Northern District of New York (with Federal Circuit Judge Randall 
Rader, now Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation) 
drastically reduced the jury’s infringement award that had been calcu-
lated through an erroneous application of the entire market value 
rule.123 In that case, Cornell University held the patent to a certain me-
thod of instruction issuance within a computer processor and sued 
Hewlett-Packard (HP) for infringement.124 Despite only holding the 
patent to one small aspect of one small component used in HP’s proc-
essors, the plaintiff sought damages based on the revenues of HP’s en-
tire server and workstation systems.125 When that proposal was rejected, 
the plaintiff sought a royalty based on large components called “CPU 
bricks,” which contained the processor coupled with many other com-
ponents unrelated to the patented invention.126 
 Judge Rader warned Cornell before trial that it had not shown its 
patented invention to comprise the basis for consumer demand for the 
CPU bricks, and thus that it should only present a royalty base com-
mensurate with the value of the processors alone.127 Undaunted, Cor-
nell proceeded to present the jury with a $23 billion royalty base, based 
on HP’s total sales of all CPU bricks, and the jury returned an award of 
$184 million.128 The court, citing the entire market value rule, reduced 
the royalty base to $6.7 billion, and the damages award to a commensu-
rate $53 million.129 Were it not for Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit 
sitting by designation, this damages award may not have been reduced, 
at least not before appeal.130 
                                                                                                                      
121 Id. The court cited Lucent’s own damages expert, conceding that there was no 
“evidence that anybody anywhere at any time ever bought Outlook, be it an equipment 
manufacturer or an individual consumer . . . because it had a date picker.” Id. at 1337–38. 
122 Id. 
123 See 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
124 Id. at 283. 
125 Id. at 283–84. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 287. 
128 Id. 
129 Cornell, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 289, 292–93. 
130 See id. 
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II. Differentiating the Entire Market Value Rule from the 
Entire Market Base Rule 
 The phrase “entire market value” rule has been used by the Fed-
eral Circuit and other courts to denote two entirely different rules.131 
This Part proposes differentiating the two usages, which will clarify de-
cisions, improve judicial decision making, and enable a fine-tuned dis-
cussion of the policy behind each underlying rule.132 Section A details 
the common method used for calculating reasonable royalties.133 Sec-
tion B elucidates the origins of the inconsistent use of the entire market 
value rule and proposes a new name, the “entire market base” rule, for 
use within the reasonable royalties context.134 The familiar “entire mar-
ket value” rule is retained for lost profits.135 
A. Methodology of Calculating Reasonable Royalties, and the Purpose of 
Separating a Royalty Base from a Royalty Rate 
1. Statutory Requirement of Reasonable Royalties 
 There is no standardized method for calculating reasonable royal-
ties.136 As noted in Section I.B above, the statutory damages require-
ment for patent infringement specifies “damages adequate to compen-
sate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of the invention by the infringer.”137 Courts have in-
terpreted this damages requirement to mandate lost profits damages for 
patentees able to demonstrate actual lost sales and a reasonable royalty 
as a minimum damages floor for patentees unable to so demonstrate.138 
Other than the directive that damages be “reasonable,” however, the 
                                                                                                                      
131 See infra notes 165–188 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra notes 165–188 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 136–164 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra notes 165–188 and accompanying text. Note that, except when quoting a 
court decision, the new name of entire market base rule will be used. 
135 See infra notes 165–188 and accompanying text.  
136 See infra note 139. 
137 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
138 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Section 284 
further instructs that a damage award shall be ‘in no event less than a reasonable royalty’; 
the purpose of this alternative is not to direct the form of compensation, but to set a floor 
below which damage awards may not fall.” (quoting Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton In-
strument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1987))). 
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statute provides little guidance as to the method of arriving at the result, 
allowing judicial creativity in fashioning an appropriate award.139 
2. Theory: Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other 
 In theory, it should make no difference whether a reasonable roy-
alty is calculated as a percentage of the entire sales of a product or as a 
percentage of some royalty base, the base itself being a fraction of the 
entire sales of the product.140 
 For example, let us suppose an infringement damages scenario in 
which the patented component roughly comprises one-fifth of the com-
pound final product offered for sale.141 The finished product may con-
tain four other components of roughly equal value to the whole as the 
patented component.142 Further suppose that it is determined that the 
patentee, in a hypothetical licensing negotiation in which the patent is 
assumed valid and infringed, would have obtained a licensing rate of 
50% of the value that its patented component contributes to the whole 
product’s profits.143 The patentee should then receive a damage award 
totaling 10% of sales of the compound product.144 It is inconsequential 
whether the damages award is reached by awarding a royalty rate of 50% 
upon a royalty base of 20% of the total profits of the final product, or by 
awarding a royalty rate of 10% of the total profits of the final product.145 
The only result of consequence is the product (r × b) of the royalty base 
with the royalty rate: in this case 0.50 × 0.20 = 0.10.146 In other words, 
50% of 20% is the same as 10% of the whole.147 Thus, in theory, there is 
                                                                                                                      
139 See TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Section 284 
does not mandate how the district court must compute [the reasonable royalty], only that 
the figure compensate for the infringement.”); Dennis S. Corgill, Competitive Injury and 
Non-Exclusive Patent Licensees, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 641, 648 (2010). 
140 See Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“There 
is nothing inherently wrong with using the market value of the entire product, especially 
when there is no established market value for the infringing component or feature, so long 
as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by the infringing component 
or feature.”) (emphasis added). 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See id. 
144 See id. This 10% award is reached by multiplying the licensing rate of 50% by the 
20% contribution of the patented component (50% of 20% is 10%). See id. 
145 See id. 
146 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
147 See id. 
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no need to discuss a royalty rate as distinguished from a royalty base, 
merely an overall royalty.148 
3. Reality: Night and Day (or Cats and Dogs) 
 The reality of a jury trial, with the risk of unfair prejudice and ju-
ror inexperience in mathematics leading to improper quantification of 
abstract concepts, paints a picture markedly different from the theo-
retical damages calculations discussed above.149 
 The Federal Circuit in its 2011 decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Micro-
soft Corp. strikingly depicted the reality of juror prejudice and the ensu-
ing harm of basing damages on total sales.150 In that case, a new trial on 
damages was granted due to the jury’s awareness of and presumed reli-
ance on the total sales revenues of the defendant’s infringing com-
pound product.151 The plaintiff, Uniloc USA, Inc., owned the patent 
for a security method for combating software piracy.152 The patent was 
found valid and infringed by the Product Activation feature in Micro-
soft’s popular Office and Windows products, and the jury awarded rea-
sonable royalty damages of $388 million.153 
 The reasons for the new trial on damages were that the plaintiff 
was permitted to use the total sales revenue figures of Microsoft Office 
and Windows both to belittle Microsoft’s expert’s damages calculation 
and to bamboozle the jury mathematically, unfairly making its own 
large damage estimates appear more reasonable.154 After Microsoft’s 
damages expert testified that appropriate damages would be $7 mil-
                                                                                                                      
148 See id. 
149 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320–21 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(“The disclosure that a company has made $19 billion dollars in revenue from an infringing 
product cannot help but skew the damages horizon for the jury, regardless of the contribu-
tion of the patented component to this revenue.”); FTC Report, supra note 104, at 210–11. 
Although the royalty calculation can decrease the rate in response to a large 
base, [panelists] expressed concern that a trier of fact, particularly a jury, may 
apply an insufficiently low royalty rate when the base is far larger than the in-
ventive feature because an appropriate rate might be minuscule. . . . It isn’t realistic 
to expect the jury to recommend a .00000001 rate. 
FTC Report, supra note 104, at 210–11 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
150 See 632 F.3d at 1318–21. 
151 See id. at 1319–21. 
152 Id. at 1296. 
153 See id. at 1296, 1311. Although the district court granted judgment as a matter of 
law ( JMOL) or, in the alternative, a new trial on the infringement issue, the Federal Cir-
cuit reversed the district court’s grant of JMOL due to the substantial evidentiary support 
for the jury’s infringement verdict. Id. 
154 See id. at 1318–21. 
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lion, Uniloc’s attorney on cross-examination pointed out that $7 mil-
lion in damages would only be 0.000035% of Microsoft’s $19 billion 
total sales revenues of Office and Windows, despite the inappositeness 
of the comparison.155 
 The plaintiff’s damages expert further used the $19 billion total 
sales revenue figure to befuddle the jury by using a pie chart to com-
pare his own $2.50 royalty estimate per copy of Microsoft Office and Win-
dows products sold to the total sales of $19 billion.156 He multiplied $2.50 
by the approximately 226 million new Microsoft software licenses to 
reach his estimate of approximately $565 million in damages.157 He 
then calculated that total damages estimate as a percentage of the total 
$19 billion in sales revenues to arrive at a percentage royalty of ap-
proximately 2.9%.158 Finally, he displayed this 2.9% value as a prepared 
pie chart graphic, in which the 2.9% represented a tiny sliver of the 
whole, to show the jury visually what a seemingly tiny award his $565 
million damages recommendation was.159 
 Citing the above abuses, the Federal Circuit characterized the Un-
iloc trial as exemplary of the “danger of admitting consideration of the 
entire market value of the accused where the patented component 
does not create the basis for customer demand.”160 Quoting the district 
court, it stated that “[t]he $19 billion cat was never put back into the 
bag.”161 
                                                                                                                      
 
155 See id. at 1320–21. Note that, according to my calculations, $7 million is in fact 
0.035% of $20 billion, not 0.000035% as the plaintiff’s attorney asserted and Microsoft’s 
damages expert reluctantly conceded. See id. 
156 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1311–12. He arrived at $19 billion in total sales revenue by 
multiplying the number of new Microsoft software licenses, 226 million, by the $85 average 
sales price per license. Id. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. Note that this 2.9% result is nothing other than the plaintiff’s expert’s $2.50 
royalty estimate per product divided by the $85 average sale price of each new Microsoft 
license. See id. Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of this ratio by the num-
ber of licenses achieves nothing; it is a tactic to mystify the jury with the illusion of rigorous 
mathematical reasoning. See id. 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 1320. 
161 See id. A word of caution regarding the procedural posture of the Uniloc case is appro-
priate here. See id. at 1321. The Federal Circuit in Uniloc was reviewing the district court’s own 
award of a new trial, and the Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the grant of the 
new damages trial. See id. It is entirely possible that, in the future, the Federal Circuit might 
find no abuse of discretion if a trial court were to refuse to grant a new trial under similar 
circumstances. See id. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit’s language appears to provide clear 
guidance that a trial court is not to allow damages testimony of the type allowed in the origi-
nal damages trial in Uniloc. See id. at 1320–21 (“This case provides a good example of the 
danger of admitting consideration of the entire market value of the accused where the pat-
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 Unfairly prejudicing the jury is clearly a significant concern in al-
lowing discussion of gross sales revenues in reasonable royalties calcula-
tions.162 This problem is especially acute in the software and high tech-
nology fields in which patented components often constitute one tiny 
fraction of the overall value of a final product offered for sale.163 To the 
extent that the patented component’s contributed value is small, the 
injustice done by awarding damages commensurate with the scale of 
the total compound product’s value is magnified.164 
B. Proposing the Name: Entire Market Base Rule 
 This Section proposes that what the Federal Circuit and other 
courts currently refer to as the “entire market value” rule, as applied to 
reasonable royalties determinations, should be renamed the “entire 
market base” rule.165 The traditional “entire market value” rule appella-
tion should be retained when traditionally applied, namely in lost prof-
its calculations.166 
1. A Rose by Any Other Name: The “Entire Market Value” Rule  
or 100% Royalty Base? 
 As explained in Part I, the entire market value rule was tradition-
ally applied to lost profits cases.167 It was used when the patent holder 
actually lost sales of the patented device and was entitled to restitution 
for all of the competitive damages it suffered.168 In those cases in which 
the patented component generated the consumer demand for the 
                                                                                                                      
ented component does not create the basis for customer demand. . . . This is in clear deroga-
tion of the entire market value rule.”). 
162 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; FTC Report, supra note 104, at 210–11. 
163 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2009 (explain-
ing that patent holdup is of particular concern in industries such as microprocessors and 
information technology in which any patent often covers only a small part of a final prod-
uct). 
164 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337–38; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2009. 
165 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 
n.34 (“[T]he Federal Circuit in Lucent v. Gateway said that the entire market value rule 
applied to reasonable royalty cases, though a review of the opinion suggests that the court 
actually confused the entire market value rule with the question of the royalty base.”). 
166 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549; Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. of Am. v. United States, 99 
Ct. Cl. 1, 20–21 (1942), rev’d in part on other grounds, 320 U.S. 1 (1943); Lemley, supra note 
1, at 662 & n.34. 
167 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549; Marconi, 99 Ct. Cl. at 20–21; Lemley, supra note 1, at 
662 & n.34; supra notes 16–130 and accompanying text 
168 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549; Marconi, 99 Ct. Cl. at 20–21; Lemley, supra note 1, at 
662 & n.34. 
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compound product, courts awarded the entire profits from sales of the 
infringing device, under the logic that the patentee would have made 
those sales itself but for the patent infringement.169 
 By contrast, the application of the entire market value rule to rea-
sonable royalties damage awards has been sharply criticized by scholars 
and by the FTC.170 Such scholars note that the logic of the entire mar-
ket value rule breaks down in reasonable royalties damages, because 
the purpose of such damages is to simulate what licensing deal the pat-
entee and infringer would have struck in a hypothetical negotiation 
taking place before the infringement began.171 In such a hypothetical 
negotiation, the licensee would obviously retain some profit for itself.172 
Thus, awarding 100 percent of profits from the compound product to 
the patentee of the infringed component, under the rubric of simulat-
ing the results of such a licensing negotiation, is clearly erroneous.173 
                                                                                                                      
 
169 See Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549; Marconi, 99 Ct. Cl. at 20–21; Lemley, supra note 1, at 
662 & n.34. 
170 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; FTC Report, supra note 104, at 210–11; Landers, supra 
note 103, at 361–62 (arguing that applying the entire market value rule in reasonable roy-
alties cases cuts against the section 284 statutory requirement of a reasonable royalty for 
the use made “of the invention,” referring to the patented component only); Lemley, supra 
note 1, at 662. 
171 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–22 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Lemley, supra note 1, at 662; infra note 201. 
172 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–63; Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation 
and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 263, 278 (2007) (noting the commonsense 
result that a patentee of a component is never responsible for all of the value of a com-
pound product containing that component). 
173 See supra notes 171–172 and accompanying text. It is unclear, however, that any 
court ever actually did award reasonable royalty damages of 100% of profits under the 
entire market value rule, despite Professor Lemley’s protestations. See Lemley, supra note 1, 
at 662–64 (arguing that a true application of the entire market value rule to reasonable 
royalties must be incorrect because there is always at least some value to the defendant’s 
product not attributable to the patent, and citing cases that purportedly applied the entire 
market value rule in such erroneous fashion). Professor Lemley cites Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 
274 F.3d 1354, 1361(Fed. Cir. 2001); Tec Air, Inc. v. Denso Manufacturing Michigan, Inc., 192 
F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999); and Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) in his criticism of the Federal Circuit’s importation of the entire market 
value rule into reasonable royalties cases. See id. at 662 n.34. Yet it is unclear that those 
cases actually apply the entire market value rule, despite naming the entire market value 
rule in the decisions. See Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361 (affirming a damage award of a 7% royalty 
rate upon a royalty base of 100% of infringing sales when the profit margin of infringing product 
was 20%—a true application of the entire market value rule would have produced a 20% 
royalty rate); Tec Air, 192 F.3d at 1357, 1362 (affirming a jury damages award corresponding 
to a royalty of 6.5% of the entire infringing revenues of infringing product, when evidence 
showed an actual profit margin of 18.6%); Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1553 (affirming a $34.125 
million jury damages award as substantially within patentee’s expert’s $54 million estimate 
comprising 7.25% of infringing sales—the 7.25% estimate was less than one-third of entire 
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 As Professor Mark Lemley notes, however, what the Federal Circuit 
often labels the entire market value rule is not actually such, but rather 
is an expansion of the royalty base used in a reasonable royalties calcula-
tion.174 The entire market value rule would award 100% of profits from 
sales of an infringing compound product, i.e., a royalty base and royalty 
                                                                                                                      
profits from infringing sales); infra text and accompanying notes 174–180. To the contrary, 
these decisions appear to award only a fraction of the entire profits from sales of infringing 
products by awarding a small royalty rate based on a 100% royalty base—in other words, 
applying what this Note describes as the “entire market base” rule. See Bose, 274 F.3d at 
1361; Tec Air, 192 F.3d at 1362; Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1553. But see Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 
n.34. Ironically, Professor Lemley (in the same footnote) distinguishes this use of a 100% 
royalty base from the “entire market value” rule, contending that the Federal Circuit in 
Lucent was confused in its usage of the term “entire market value” rule. See Lucent, 580 F.3d 
at 1339; Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361; Tec Air, 192 F.3d at 1362; Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1552; Lemley, 
supra note 1, at 662 n.34, 668 & n.63 (“[T]he Federal Circuit in Lucent v. Gateway said that 
the entire market value rule applied to reasonable royalty cases, though a review of the 
opinion suggests that the court actually confused the entire market value rule with the 
question of the royalty base.”); infra notes 174–180 and accompanying text. A review of the 
Bose decision, and especially the exceptionally lucid opinion of the district court—authored 
by Judge Patti Saris, renowned in the patent bar—reveals that the damages award affirmed 
by the Federal Circuit comprised but a small fraction of profits from infringing sales. See 
Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361; Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 138, 164–67 (D. Mass. 2000), 
aff’d, 274 F.3d at 1361 (awarding, in bench trial, a 7% royalty rate of a royalty base compris-
ing 100% of infringing sales and employing the Georgia-Pacific factors to arrive at an award 
slightly above 25% of profits from infringing sales—not 100% of profits—when the profit 
margin for infringing sales comprised approximately 20% of sales revenues). Fonar simi-
larly affirmed a jury award of $34.125 million because it was substantially less than the 
7.25% of sales recommended by the plaintiff’s expert when that 7.25% estimate was be-
tween one-quarter to one-third—not 100%—of the defendant’s entire profits from infring-
ing sales. See 107 F.3d at 1553. In Tec Air, the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury damages award 
of 6.5% of infringing sales revenues when evidence showed the profit margins from the 
infringing sales to be 18.6%. See 192 F.3d at 1362; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 24, Tec Air, 
192 F.3d 1353 (No. 99-1011) (citing evidence that defendant’s profits were at least 18.6%). 
Thus, none of the cases that Professor Lemley cites actually apply the entire market value 
rule to reasonable royalties calculations, but rather apply a 100% royalty base. See Lucent, 
580 F.3d at 1339; Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361; Tec Air, 192 F.3d at 1362; Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1552; 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34, 668 & n.63. He appears to have been mired in the same 
100%-royalty-base confusion of which he accused the Federal Circuit’s Lucent opinion. 
Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34, 668 & n.63; see Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Bose, 274 F.3d at 
1361; Tec Air, 192 F.3d at 1362; Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1552. 
174 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34, 668–69 & n.63 (arguing that the Federal Cir-
cuit in Lucent became confused and labeled as the “entire market value” rule what was, in 
actuality, a 100% royalty base). Amusingly, the Federal Circuit in Lucent cites to and gently 
criticizes the very Lemley article which itself criticizes the Lucent opinion as confused. See 
Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34. Despite lacking access to a time 
machine, Chief Judge Paul Michel had in fact obtained access to a draft of Professor Lem-
ley’s forthcoming article that then turned around and criticized Judge Michel’s opinion 
criticizing it. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34. 
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rate both equaling 100%.175 By contrast, what the Federal Circuit has 
labeled in the reasonable royalty context as the entire market value rule 
is allowing the royalty base to equal 100% of total profits when the royalty 
rate is then some percentage thereof.176 In other words, a reasonable 
royalty of less than 100% of profits is awarded in what the Federal Cir-
cuit has misleadingly labeled as the entire market value rule.177 
 An award of the entire market value of the compound invention is 
thus not contemplated in reasonable royalties calculations; rather, such 
value is only used as the base of a further royalty calculation.178 The ap-
propriate name for such rule in the context of reasonable royalties cal-
culations is the “entire market base” rule, and it should henceforth be 
labeled as such in court decisions and scholarly writing.179 
 For its traditional application to lost profits calculations, the “en-
tire market value” rule is well named and I do not propose to alter its 
usage or appellation within that ambit.180 
2. Basis for Consumer Demand: The Correct Standard? 
 The following discussion is of the Federal Circuit’s current standard 
for applying the entire market base rule.181 Part III proposes modifying 
and recasting the entire market base rule.182 
 The standard that the Federal Circuit has applied in determining 
whether to apply the entire market base rule is whether the patented 
component constitutes the basis for consumer demand for the prod-
uct.183 In evaluating this standard, we must remember that the rule must 
                                                                                                                      
 
175 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 662–64 & n.34, 668–69 & 668 n.63. Professor Lemley ar-
gues that a true application of the entire market value rule to reasonable royalties must be 
incorrect because there is always at least some value to the defendant’s product not attribut-
able to the patent. See id. Implicit in the argument is that the rule contemplates awarding 
100% of the value of defendant’s product to the patentee. See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34, 668–69 & n.63. Hen-
ceforth in this Note, I will refer to this rule as the entire market base rule. 
180 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339; Lemley, supra note 1, at 662 n.34, 668–69 & n.63. 
181 See infra notes 182–188 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 189–238 and accompanying text. 
183 See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337–39 (“The first flaw with any application of the entire 
market value rule in the present case is the lack of evidence demonstrating the patented 
method of the [plaintiff’s] patent as the basis—or even a substantial basis—of the con-
sumer demand for [defendant’s compound product].”); Bose, 274 F.3d at 1361; Tec Air, 192 
F.3d at 1357, 1362; Fonar, 107 F.3d at 1552; Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549 (“We have held that 
the entire market value rule permits recovery of damages based on the value of a pat-
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aid in arriving at a reasonable royalty determination that accurately si-
mulates the result of a hypothetical licensing negotiation undertaken 
prior to infringement.184 
 When the patented component comprises the basis for consumer 
demand for the final compound device, it indeed seems reasonable 
that the patentee would have an especially strong bargaining position 
for demanding a significant share of the ultimate profits.185 Presuma-
bly, under such circumstances, the hypothetical licensee would not be 
able to generate any appreciable consumer demand for the product 
without the inclusion of the patented component.186 
                                                                                                                     
 By contrast, when the patented component is not the basis for 
consumer demand, such as in Uniloc and Lucent, the patentee would 
have been but one licensor among many of small, sometimes even triv-
ial, components and would not have significant bargaining power.187 
Thus, the entire market base rule, as the Federal Circuit currently ap-
plies it, is likely a helpful tool for approximating the outcome of such a 
hypothetical negotiation.188 
III. Proposing a New Model of the Entire Market Base Rule 
 This Part expands on Part II’s separating of the entire market base 
rule from the entire market value rule.189 It shows that, far from mere 
pedantry, this distinguishing and defining of the entire market base 
rule enables examination of the statutory and policy foundations of the 
entire market base rule and refinement of the rule to better conform 
 
entee’s entire apparatus containing several features when the patent-related feature is the 
basis for customer demand.” (internal citations omitted)). 
184 See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–22 (setting out the famous list of factors, 
adopted by the Federal Circuit and known as the Georgia-Pacific factors, to consider in si-
mulating a hypothetical licensing negotiation); Corgill, supra note 139, at 648–49; John M. 
Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2141 (2007); Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 77, at 1999–2000, 2018. 
185 See supra note 184. 
186 See supra note 184. Though, in certain circumstances, there may have existed non-
infringing alternatives available to the licensee at the time before infringement, which 
might lessen the patentee’s bargaining power—the patented component being the basis 
for consumer demand notwithstanding—the Federal Circuit has rejected that possibility. 
See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (rejecting as 
“wrong as a matter of law” allowing noninfringing alternatives available to the infringer to 
lessen reasonable royalties). But see Lemley, supra note 1, at 667 n.60 (criticizing Mars for 
failing to account for the realities of what a hypothetical negotiation would actually entail). 
187 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1320; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337–39; Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. 
at 1120–22; infra note 201. 
188 See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–22; infra note 201. 
189 See supra notes 192–238 and accompanying text. 
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with those foundations.190 To fulfill the statutory directive, the entire 
market base rule should be recast as an application of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 403, which mandates weighing the prejudicial value of evi-
dence against its probative value.191 
A. Unfair Prejudice: Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
 The proper framework for the discussion of unfairly prejudicial 
testimony is Federal Rule of Evidence 403.192 Couching the problem of 
unfairly prejudicial testimony in terms of the entire market value rule, 
as the Federal Circuit currently does, is obfuscatory and likely to hinder 
the development of this area of law, causing confusion in the rule’s ap-
plication.193 
 As has been shown in Part II, in theory, there is no one proper me-
thod of arriving at a reasonable royalty value; yet there is a potentially 
severe prejudicial effect of one method of calculation.194 In the ab-
stract, a jury should be capable of evaluating the proper incremental 
worth of one component of a much larger conglomerate product by 
evaluating the worth of every other component that contributes value 
to that product and placing the infringing component in that proper 
context.195 Yet the Federal Circuit clearly believes that, at least under 
current trial practice methods, juries are unable to do so reliably.196 
According to the 2011 Federal Circuit decision of Uniloc USA, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., a trial court judge must disallow the jury from hearing 
the total sales revenues of any large compound product in which the 
patented component is not the basis for consumer demand for that 
product.197 
                                                                                                                      
 
190 See supra notes 192–238 and accompanying text. 
191 See supra notes 192–238 and accompanying text. 
192 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, 
or Waste of Time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
193 See infra notes 194–229 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 140–161 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 140–148 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra notes 149–161 and accompanying text. 
197 See 632 F.3d 1292, 1318–21 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The court elaborated: “The disclosure 
that a company has made $19 billion dollars in revenue from an infringing product cannot 
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 Yet Uniloc raises a question: why should a jury be prevented from 
hearing the entire value of a product when the patented component is 
not the basis for consumer demand, yet be allowed to hear such evi-
dence when the component is the basis for consumer demand?198 If 
hearing the entire market value of a compound product is unfairly pre-
judicial, as the Federal Circuit contends in Uniloc, then why should a 
jury ever hear such evidence in reasonable royalties determinations?199 
The Federal Circuit’s guidance appears to amount to the sanctioning of 
unfairly prejudicial evidence in cases in which the component does in 
fact constitute the basis for consumer demand.200 
 It is perhaps possible to reconcile this difficulty by noting the pur-
pose of the entire market base rule: it is simply one means of arriving at 
the statutory requirement of a reasonable royalty approximating the 
licensing agreement the parties would have arranged in a hypothetical 
negotiation.201 The jury is thus asked to arrive at its sense of how the 
infringing company would have valued the patented component.202 
When that component is responsible for the consumer demand for the 
finished compound product, it is indeed reasonable for the jury to con-
sider the entire sales value of the compound product in determining 
how the infringing company would value the patented component.203 
In such cases there is less unfairness in the jury being swayed by the 
scale of numbers by considering the entire sales proceeds of the final 
product.204 This is because, in this hypothetical negotiation, the pat-
entee has significant control and bargaining power by bringing to the 
negotiating table the very component that generates the sales of the 
contemplated final product.205 
 Nevertheless, by couching their discussion of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence as a discussion of the appropriate guidelines for applying the 
                                                                                                                      
help but skew the damages horizon for the jury, regardless of the contribution of the pat-
ented component to this revenue.” Id. at 1320. 
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 1318–21. 
200 See id. 
201 See id.; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339 (defending use of the entire market base rule in rea-
sonable royalties calculations in appropriate circumstances); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–22 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (setting out the famous list of 
factors, adopted by the Federal Circuit and known as the Georgia-Pacific factors, to consider in 
simulating a hypothetical licensing negotiation); Corgill, supra note 139, at 648–49; Golden, 
supra note 184, at 2141; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 1999–2000, 2018. 
202 See supra note 201. 
203 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
204 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
205 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
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entire market base rule (which they term the “entire market value” 
rule), courts impede the productive development of this area of the 
law.206 Where the issue is one of jury prejudice, the proper context for 
discussion is Federal Rule of Evidence 403.207 
 Furthermore, Rule 403 is a better fit with reasonable royalties due 
to the open-endedness of the statutory requirement, allowing for a myr-
iad of possible appropriate schemes for determining reasonable royal-
ties damages.208 It makes little sense for the Federal Circuit to paint in 
such broad strokes as to prescribe an unnuanced rule impossible to tai-
lor to the multifariousness of reasonable royalties determinations.209 
This open-ended statutory damages scheme, rather, calls for perceptive 
creativity and fact-specific adaptation, which is the forte of the district 
court judge and the institutional strength of the trial court.210 Because 
the issue here is one of jury prejudice skewing the verdict—not of a pat-
ent-specific situation in need of a patent-specific rule laid down by the 
Federal Circuit—the Federal Circuit should leave the ultimate appraisal 
of prejudicial evidence under the limitless variations of hypothetical ne-
gotiations simulations to the sound discretion of the trial judge.211 
 It is not argued here that the entire market base rule should be ab-
olished.212 To the contrary, the Federal Circuit should continue to guide 
the district courts in their application of the entire market base rule, but 
cast it in its proper framework as a specific application of Rule 403.213 By 
thus recasting its teachings in terms of Rule 403, the Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
206 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
207 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
208 See 35 U.S.C. § 284; TWM, 789 F.2d at 899 (“Section 284 does not mandate how the 
district court must compute [the reasonable royalty], only that the figure compensate for 
the infringement.”); Corgill, supra note 139, at 648. 
209 See supra note 208. 
210 See 35 U.S.C. § 284; TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“Section 284 does not mandate how the district court must compute [the reasonable roy-
alty], only that the figure compensate for the infringement.”); Corgill, supra note 139, at 
648; infra note 215. 
211 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; supra note 208. Like other decisions under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403, these district court decisions would then be reviewed for abuse of dis-
cretion. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s notes (“Situations in this area call for 
balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result 
from its admission.”); Finan v. Good Earth Tools, Inc., 565 F.3d 1076, 1080 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(“This court reviews the evidentiary rulings of a district court for abuse of discretion.”); Lewis 
v. District of Columbia, 793 F.2d 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 
31, 37 (2d Cir. 1985); Am. Jur. Evid. § 336 (“On appeal from a ruling admitting or excluding 
evidence, raising the question whether its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair 
prejudice, the sole issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion.”). 
212 See supra note 208. 
213 See id. 
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could bring much needed clarity to this area of law.214 It would simulta-
neously provide the guidance district courts require to arrive at consis-
tent results across jurisdictions, while leaving them the discretion requi-
site to achieving just and reasonable decisions, as explained below.215 
 Note further that the recent Federal Circuit decisions would come 
out the same way under this proposed standard.216 The Federal Circuit 
would evaluate the evidentiary ruling of the district court judge for 
abuse of discretion.217 When the patented component did not consti-
tute the basis for consumer demand, and the total sales of a compound 
product were presented to and unfairly prejudiced the jury—as occurred 
in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. and Uniloc —the district court’s 
decision would be overturned for abuse of discretion.218 
 The Supreme Court emphasized the district courts’ institutional 
capacity for grasping the subtle nuances of negotiations in its 1986 de-
cision in Evans v. Jeff D.219 In that case, the parties to a civil rights case 
reached a negotiated settlement waiving attorney’s fees in the face of 
the Fees Act, a federal statute granting mandatory attorney’s fees in 
such cases.220 The settlement required approval of the court, and the 
district court approved it, refusing on later motion to grant attorney’s 
fees.221 The role of the court in that case was to ensure that the settle-
ment reached was fair and equitable, and that the settlement consti-
tuted “an adequate quid pro quo for [plaintiff’s] waiver of attorney’s 
fees.”222 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ap-
proval on the grounds that allowing waiver of attorney’s fees would fru-
strate the intent of Congress and chill civil rights actions by shrinking 
the pool of attorneys willing to litigate them.223 The Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit, stating: 
                                                                                                                      
214 See id. 
215 See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s notes; Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996) (emphasizing the desirability of consistency in patent law 
across jurisdictions and charging the Federal Circuit with fostering such uniformity); supra 
note 208; cf. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 742–43 (1986) (committing the appraisal of the 
reasonableness of class-action settlements, including the waiver of statutorily granted attor-
neys' fees, to the sound discretion of district courts on a case-by-case basis in light of all rele-
vant circumstances (citing Moore v. Nat’l Assoc. of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 762 F.2d 1093, 1113 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, J., concurring))). 
216 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
217 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
218 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
219 See 475 U.S. at 741–43. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. at 723. 
222 See id. at 741. 
223 See id. 
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What the outcome of this settlement illustrates is that the Fees 
Act has given the victims of civil rights violations a powerful 
weapon that improves their ability to employ counsel, to ob-
tain access to the courts, and thereafter to vindicate their 
rights by means of settlement or trial. For aught that appears, 
it was the “coercive” effect of respondents’ statutory right to 
seek a fee award that motivated petitioners’ exceptionally ge-
nerous offer. . . . [W]e shall rely primarily on the sound dis-
cretion of the district courts to appraise the reasonableness of 
particular class-action settlements on a case-by-case basis, in 
the light of all the relevant circumstances. In this case, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion . . . .224 
The Supreme Court thus refused to second guess the district court’s 
decision, as the institutional strength of the district court is in evaluat-
ing the nuances of all of the relevant circumstances presented by the 
evidence and the testimony.225 
 The hypothetical negotiation that the reasonable royalty award is 
intended to simulate bears certain striking similarities to judicial evalu-
ation of a settlement negotiation.226 Like the Supreme Court in Evans, 
the Federal Circuit should allow the district court, which is best situated 
to evaluate and direct the context-specific contours of a hypothetical 
negotiation for licensing fees, to use its sound discretion and institu-
tional strength in determining reasonable royalties.227 This would be 
accomplished through recasting the “entire market base” rule within 
the probative-versus-prejudicial balancing framework of Rule 403.228 
                                                                                                                      
224 See id. at 741–42. 
Each negotiation, like each litigant, is unique; reasonableness can only be de-
termined by looking at the strength of the plaintiff’s case, the stage at which 
the settlement is effective, the substantiality of the relief obtained on the mer-
its, and the explanations of the parties as to why they did what they did. 
Id. (quoting Moore, 762 F.2d at 1113 (Wald, J., concurring)). 
225 See Evans, 475 U.S. at 741–42. 
226 See id.; Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–22 (setting out the famous list of factors, 
adopted by the Federal Circuit and known as the Georgia-Pacific factors, to consider in si-
mulating a hypothetical licensing negotiation); Corgill, supra note 139, at 648–49; Golden, 
supra note 184, at 2141; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 1999–2000, 2018. Although 
one is decided by the judge and the other by the factfinder, both are intended to encom-
pass the realities of an actual negotiation. See Evans, 475 U.S. at 741–42; Georgia-Pacific, 318 
F. Supp. at 1120–22. 
227 Evans, 475 U.S. at 741–42. 
228 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
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This proposal would further provide the benefit of applying established 
principles of federal evidentiary law.229 
B. Out of the Frying Pan and into the Fire: Rule 403 “Waste of Time” 
 An alternative strategy towards avoiding unfairly prejudicial evi-
dence of the total sales of a compound product is to allow the defendant 
to present evidence of other contributors of value besides the infringing 
component.230 This strategy recognizes that the underlying problem is 
one analogous to the “vividness effect”: that jurors after having heard 
voluminous testimony on the value of the patented component will dis-
regard their more limited and muted background knowledge of the 
value of all other contributors of value to the final compound prod-
uct.231 
 Thus, under this proposal, in the Uniloc case, Microsoft would have 
been allowed to present expert testimony regarding the value of every 
feature of Microsoft Office and Microsoft Windows, which would have 
forced the jury to gain the proper perspective for how little value the 
infringing Product Activation feature provided.232 Once forced to con-
sider the Product Activation feature side by side with the myriad useful 
abilities and features of the entire Microsoft Office suite and the entire 
Windows operating system (such as writing, saving, and printing Word 
documents; composing emails; creating, saving, and printing Excel 
spreadsheets, etc.), the jurors would have easily seen the plaintiff’s ex-
pert’s 2.9% estimate as a gross exaggeration of contribution and been 
equipped to discern the plaintiff’s pie chart ruse.233 
                                                                                                                      
229 See Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318–21; Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339. 
230 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 77, at 2024–25. Note that some scholars raise 
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liability for infringing other patents not asserted in the suit. See id. at 2024 & n.92. It seems 
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231 See Keith E. Stanovich, How to Think Straight About Psychology 71–72 
(1985) (defining the vividness effect in the marketing context: that the vividness of testi-
monial evidence eclipses the importance of more reliable scientific data in a listener’s 
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2025, 2029–35 (positing that juries that never hear about other contributors to total value 
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 The problem with this method of approaching reasonable royalties 
again lies with Federal Rule of Evidence 403, namely undue delay and 
waste of time.234 It would be a mind-numbing exercise rivaling Psyche’s 
grain-sorting toil (without the aid of ants) for any juror to sit through 
the dozens, if not hundreds, of presentations of evidence of the value 
of every single value-adding feature of a mammoth product like Micro-
soft Office.235 
 The district court may thus, if it wishes to admit evidence of the 
total sales value of a compound product, find itself caught between the 
twin perils of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.236 One avenue of eviden-
tiary proof may be inadmissible under Rule 403 due to its prejudicial 
effect outweighing its probative value, while the other avenue may be 
inadmissible under Rule 403 for waste of time due to its voluminous-
ness.237 Nevertheless, between these two evidentiary avenues—or a 
third, disallowing evidence of the entire market value of a compound 
product—a district court is likely well equipped to fashion an appropri-
ate evidentiary ruling tailored to the exigencies of the particular cir-
cumstances and to the strengths and susceptibilities of the jury.238 
Conclusion 
 Considerable confusion has accompanied the application of the 
entire market value rule to reasonable royalties calculations. This Note 
has addressed some sources of this confusion, and argued for better 
delineation of the scope and purpose of the rule. I propose a new 
name for the rule within reasonable royalties calculations, the “entire 
market base” rule. This new appellation will allow a clearer focus on the 
statutory and policy underpinnings of the rule. I also propose a recast-
ing of the rule as a specific application of the Federal Rule of Evidence 
403. It is hoped that the steps developed here may contribute to a 
clearer and fairer application of patent law and the adjustment of pat-
ent remedies to best incentivize innovation. 
Michael A. Greene 
 
234 See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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